Abstract. This paper corrects some mathematical errors in Holmström (1999) and clarifies the assumptions that are sufficient for the results of Holmström (1999) . The results remain qualitatively the same.
Introduction
This note corrects some mathematical errors in the career concerns model with normally distributed type and signal in Holmström (1999) Sections 2.1-2.3. The corrigendum is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and the additional assumptions on the cost function that are sufficient for some of the results in Holmström (1999) . Section 2.1 derives the equilibrium strategy in detail, correcting some errors in the derivation of Holmström (1999) . Section 2.2 first corrects an inconsistency between Holmström (1999) Sections 2.1 and 2.2. Second, it introduces an assumption necessary and sufficient for the equilibrium labor supply to converge to zero as the type becomes persistent or the random component of the output large. Third, it discusses ways to resolve the indeterminacy of equilibrium in the undiscounted case. Section 2.3 presents two ways to modify the definitions in Holmström (1999) Section 2.3, both of which correct an error in the proof of Proposition 2.
The model
The notation and the model follow Holmström (1999) . The players are a manager and a competitive market. Time is discrete, indexed by t ∈ N, and the horizon is infinite. The manager initially has ability η 1 , which is symmetric incomplete information, and commonly believed to be drawn from the prior probability distribution N(m 1 , 1/h 1 ), where h 1 ∈ (0, ∞) is the precision (the inverse of the variance). Ability evolves according to η t+1 = η t + δ t , where δ t ∼ N(0, 1/h δ ) i.i.d. over time. The basic model of Holmström (1999) assumes h δ = ∞, which is later relaxed. This corrigendum treats the cases h δ = ∞ and h δ ∈ (0, ∞) together. Each period t, the manager chooses laborâ t ∈ [0, ∞], which generates public output y t = η t +â t + ǫ t , where ǫ t ∼ N(0, 1/h ǫ ) i.i.d. over time, h ǫ ∈ (0, ∞), and ǫ t is independent of η 1 , δ s for any t, s.
1 The competitive and risk-neutral market observes y t−1 = (y 1 , . . . , y t−1 ) ∈ R t−1 at the start of period t and pays the manager a wage w t (y t−1 ) ∈ [−∞, ∞] equal to the manager's expected output. The market's wage rule w = (w t ) ∞ t=1 is a sequence of functions w t :
The manager's cost of choosing laborâ is g(â), with g continuously differentiable on R + , increasing, convex, g ′ (0) = 0 and limâ →∞ g ′ (â) = ∞. Holmström (1999) only assumes that g is increasing and convex. Sufficient for the maximizer of the manager's utility function (1) to exist is that g is continuous, because the action set [0, ∞] is compact. For the first order approach used in Holmström (1999) to be valid, a convex and continuously differentiable g is sufficient.
The manager's public strategy a = (a t ) ∞ t=1 is a sequence of functions a t : here has only one strategic player, so trivially a product structure. Hereafter, a public strategy is simply called strategy.
The manager's discount factor is β ∈ [0, 1). The undiscounted model with β = 1 is discussed at the end of Section 2.2. The manager's ex post utility is
A perfect public equilibrium consists of the manager's strategy a * and the market's wage rule w such that for all t and y t−1 ,
Hereafter, a pure perfect public equilibrium is simply called equilibrium. Restricting attention to pure strategies is w.l.o.g., because g is convex and any E[y t+k |y t−1 ] that the manager can generate with mixed actions can be generated by pure actions.
2.1.
Results for the basic model. The market is Bayesian and conjectures the manager's strategy a * t (y t−1 ), so de-biases the output y t to the signal z t := y t −a * t (y t−1 ), which in equilibrium equals η t + ǫ t . From the manager's perspective, z t = η t + ǫ t +â t − a * t (y t−1 ). The mean of the market's belief at the start of period t (after t − 1 signals) is denoted m t and the precision h t . The precision of the market's belief after seeing y t but before taking into account the shock δ t added to η t is 1 The independence of ǫ t , η 1 , δ s for all t, s is implicit in Holmström (1999) . 2 A product structure means that the informativeness of the public signal about the actions of the other strategic players is independent of a player's own action.
The market sets the wage w t (y t−1 ) = m t (z t−1 ) + a * t (y t−1 ), where z t = (z 1 , . . . , z t ). The common belief precision h t evolves deterministically, which is used to take it outside the expectations below.
The manager's time-t expectation E [w τ (y τ −1 )|y t−1 ] of the future wage w τ , τ > t given y t−1 and
with the notational convention t s=t+1 x s = 0 and
forming expectations about future signals z i , i > t, the manager expects her future selves to follow the equilibrium strategy, therefore E [z i |y
Substituting the expected signals into (4) results in
Substituting (5) into (2) yields the manager's objective function
3 To derive h t+1 , the market first updates η t (which has precision h t ) in response to the signal z t (precision h ǫ ), obtaining precision h t + h ǫ . Then the market adds the variance 1 h δ of the normally distributed shock δ t−1 to the variance 1 ht−1+hǫ of the normally distributed updated η t−1 . If h δ = ∞, then h t + h ǫ = h t+1 for all t. Holmström (1999) definesĥ t := h t + h ǫ , but interprets it on p. 173 as "the precision on η t+1 before observing y t+1 " without clarifying thatĥ t is the precision after observing y t and before adding the shock δ t .
and taking the first order condition (FOC) w.r.t.â t results in
The manager's marginal benefit ofâ t is the discounted sum of the responses of future wages tô a t . Because the wage is paid in advance, period-t effort does not affect the period-t wage. The SOC holds, because g is convex. When h δ = ∞, the FOC in Holmström (1999) is Equation (10), reproduced in (H10):
It corresponds to the current paper's FOC (7) with h δ = ∞, in which case h s−1 + h ǫ = h s , but Holmström erroneously starts the sum from index t, not t + 1. Holmström's Equation (21), reproduced below in (H21), corresponds to the current paper's (7) for general h δ and starts the sum correctly from t + 1, but has a different error. Holmström (1999) defines µ t := ht ht+hǫ , and his FOC is
Taking h δ = ∞ (so that h i +h ǫ = h i+1 ), the LHS in (H21) becomes
, which is inconsistent with (H10) where the subscript of h s+1 is s. To make (H21) consistent with (H10) when h δ = ∞ and the sum in (H10) has been corrected to start at t + 1, the product in (H21) should end at s − 1, not s. Thus (H21)
should be written
The LHS of (8) is
, same as the marginal benefit in (7). The intuition for the correct FOC is that increasing the manager's labor a t by one unit increases the market's mean belief m t+1 next period by hǫ ht+hǫ units, but given m t+1 , does not directly affect any m τ , τ = t + 1. For any n ∈ N, increasing m n by one unit raises m n+1 by hn hn+hǫ units, but does not directly affect any m τ , τ / ∈ {n, n + 1}. Therefore increasingâ t by one unit raises m t+k , k ≥ 1 by
units. The expected wage E[w t+k |y t−1 ] increases one for one with m t+k , because a * n is independent of m ℓ for any n, ℓ, thus there is no multiplier effect fromâ t to m n+k via a * n . A unit increase in w t+k is worth β k at time t.
The stationary case.
A stationary equilibrium requires h δ < ∞ and features a constant belief precision h t+1 = h t =: h. In terms of µ := h h+hǫ , the steady state marginal benefit of the manager's action (the LHS of (8)) is
This matches Holmström (1999) Equation (22), reproduced below in (H22), but is not derived from (H21). The steady state version of (H21) is instead (1 − µ)
, which has different comparative statics from those in Holmström (1999) Proposition 1.
For the stationary labor supply a * to satisfy Holmström's Equation (22) 
the assumptions g ∈ C 1 , g ′ (0) = 0 and limâ →∞ g ′ (â) > 1 are sufficient. Holmström (1999) p. 174 states that a * is close to zero when β < 1 and h δ is large relative to h ǫ , which is true iff the additional 4 assumption that g ′ (a) = 0 ⇒ a = 0 holds. If this assumption is violated, i.e. if g ′ (a) = 0 for all a ∈ [0, k] for some k > 0, then as the marginal benefit of labor (the LHS of (H22)) converges to zero, the manager's labor supply a * converges to k, not zero. Holmström (1999) p. 174 compares the manager's labor supply under h δ = ∞ and h δ < ∞, both when β < 1 and when β = 1. The comparison is indeterminate if β = 1, because in this case, one of the summands in the manager's utility (6) is infinite 5 , so the maximizer of (6) If β = 1 and h δ = ∞, then the marginal benefit of labor in the FOC (8) diverges, so the solution of the FOC is a * t = ∞. This infinite labor presents a problem for Bayesian updating and by extension the derivation of the FOC itself. If the market expects a * t (y t−1 ) = ∞, then anyâ t < ∞ leads to y t < ∞, which is off the equilibrium path, so Bayes' rule does not apply. One way to resolve the updating problem is to use belief threats to deter the manager from deviating, e.g. set m t+1 = −∞ after y t < ∞. If the manager choosesâ t = ∞, then the output is y t = ∞ for any η t , thus uninformative about the type. By Bayes' rule, the market's mean belief is m t+1 = m t after
2.3. Transient effects. On p. 174, Holmström (1999) 
clarifying whether the µ i , i > 1 are independent variables or the functions of µ 1 recursively defined in Holmström's Equation (17):
4 Recall that Holmström (1999) only assumes that g is increasing and convex.
5 Proof:
hj+1
hj +hǫ ≥ min This distinction becomes important in the equation
which is unlabeled in Holmström (1999) . If all µ i are treated as independent variables, then
s i=3 µ i , because each µ i is then obtained from µ 2 by i − 2 iterations of (H17). In either case, the first equality in (10) fails in general. If all µ i are independent variables and µ 2 = µ s+1 , then
If each µ i is treated as a function of the argument of b s , and µ s+1 = 1, then 
Either way to make (10) hold ensures that the inductive proof on p. 174 of Holmström (1999) is correct, i.e. that γ 1 := (1 − µ 1 ) ∞ s=2 β s−1 s i=2 µ i (the LHS of (H21) at t = 1) decreases in µ 1 . The same proof shows that the LHS of (8) at t = 1 decreases in µ 1 . Using (11) in (10) and replacing µ 1 , µ 2 with µ t , µ t+1 respectively shows that for any t, the LHS-s of (H21) and (8) decrease in µ t . This proves Proposition 2 in Holmström (1999) .
If the definition of b s is not altered to (11), but remains b s (µ t ) = (1 −µ t ) s i=t+1 µ i , then to prove that for any t, the LHS of (H21) decreases in µ t , the equation (10) should be modified separately for each t. Specifically, µ 1 and µ 2 should be replaced with µ t and µ t+1 respectively, and both b s+1 and b s should be replaced with b s+t .
